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WHO'S THE AUTHOR? A BRIGHT-LINE RULE FOR
SPECIALLY COMMISSIONED WORKS MADE FOR HIRE
Only one thing is impossible for God: to find any sense
in any copyright law on the planet. Whenever a copyright
law is to be made or altered, then the idiots assemble.'
-Mark Twain
When I was recently asked to write a television script,
the studio insisted that I sign four copies of an affidavit
giving it all rights to my writing "throughout the Uni-
verse in perpetuity. " I telephoned a studio lawyer to see if
I could keep a few moons of Jupiter. The lawyer became
angry and pointed to the section of the affidavit in which
I recognized that the studio "becomes the Author of the
Writer's Work." 'We mean it," the lawyer said.2
-Charles Mann, Contributing Editor,
The Atlantic Monthly
"Who's the author" of this comment? Because my name appears
at the top of this page and because I actually put fingers to key-
board to type out these words, most people would probably re-
spond, "You are," and wonder why I asked them who authored my
own paper. If I asked a copyright practitioner the same question,
however, she may have a very different response. Instead of as-
suming I am the author, she would recognize that, as a single
piece written for inclusion in a periodical, this comment is part of
a "collective work," statutorily defined as "a work.. . in which a
number of contributions, constituting separate and independent
works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole."' Be-
cause of this, the copyright practitioner would know my work
may qualify as a "work made for hire" if certain other conditions
are met. If they are, she would tell me that I am not the "author"
1. MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN'S NOTEBOOK 381-82 (Cooper Square Publishers 1972).
2. Charles C. Mann, Who Will Own Your Next Good Idea?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY
(Sept. 1998), http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/98sep/copy3.htm.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
1175
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
(statutorily, anyway) despite the fact that I am the individual
who "created" the work.4 Instead, "the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author,"'
which, in this case, would most likely be the University of Rich-
mond Law Review ("Law Review").'
The concept of authorship has major implications in U.S. copy-
right law. First and foremost, the copyright in a work "vests ini-
tially in the author . .. of the work."' Accordingly, if my comment
is considered a work made for hire, the copyright in it would vest
initially in Law Review instead of in me. But even if my comment
is not a work made for hire, this is not the end of the story. While
it is true that the copyright would vest initially in me, copyrights
are freely transferrable;' I could easily sign an agreement with
Law Review transferring all of my copyright rights to it. I would
still be the author of the work, but Law Review would be the
owner of the associated copyright. While both paths seemingly
lead to the same result-that is, with Law Review owning the
copyright in my comment-one other right authors have under
U.S. copyright law makes the fact that I remain the author of the
work significant.
U.S. copyright law grants to an author of a work other than a
work made for hire a right to terminate any transfers (except tes-
tamentary transfers) she has made of her copyright, with the re-
sult being that ownership of the copyright reverts to the author of
the work.' This termination right is a powerful one; it is inaliena-
ble and the author retains the right to terminate transfers "not-
withstanding any agreement to the contrary.""o If, therefore, my
comment is not a work made for hire, and if I choose to transfer
the copyright in my comment to Law Review, I will eventually
have the right to terminate that transfer and regain ownership of
the copyright. If, however, my comment is a work made for hire,
no termination right will exist; the only way I could gain owner-
4. The term "creator" will be used to indicate the individual who authors a work in
the colloquial sense, and the term "author" will be used to indicate the statutory author.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
6. The term "commissioner" will be used to indicate the "employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared." Id.
7. § 201(a).
8. See § 201(d).
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
10. § 203(a)(5).
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ship of any copyright rights in my comment would be to negotiate
with Law Review.
Admittedly, the essentially non-existent financial stakes in my
situation make the determination of who is the author of this
comment mostly irrelevant. It is not difficult, however, to imagine
situations where the financial stakes for both the commissioner
and the creator of the work are substantially higher. For exam-
ple, if you replace "me" with the screenplay writer for the next
great Hollywood blockbuster and replace "Law Review" with a
major movie studio, the possible financial stakes at issue become
clear." With the financial stakes as high as they could be, it is
important that a commissioner and a creator know at the time
they enter their agreement whether the agreement is a work
made for hire agreement or simply a transfer agreement.
In determining whether a work is a work made for hire, one of
the questions that must be asked is whether the creator and the
commissioner agreed "in a written instrument signed by them"
that the work would be a work made for hire.12 The existence of a
written agreement is a statutory requirement; if one does not ex-
ist, the work cannot be a work made for hire." While this ques-
tion seems like a simple one to answer, that seeming simplicity is
deceiving. The statute makes no mention of when the required
written instrument must be executed, and a split has developed
between the circuit courts concerning this very matter. While all
courts that have considered the matter have held that the parties
must agree that the work is a work made for hire prior to the
work's creation, some courts have held that the written instru-
ment must also be executed prior to the work's creation, while
others have held that the written agreement can be executed af-
ter the work's creation, so long as it memorializes some pre-
creation agreement.1 4
This comment argues that the best way to clarify the answer to
the question "Who's the author?" (and thus to clarify whether the
creator has a termination right) is to resolve the circuit split in
favor of a bright-line rule requiring execution of the written
11. Works created for use "as part of a motion picture" may also qualify as works
made for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (definition of "work made for hire").
12. Id. (definition of "work made for hire").
13. See id.
14. See infra Part II.
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agreement prior to the creation of the work. Part I introduces the
legal framework under which the issue must be analyzed. Part II
reviews the holdings on each side of the circuit split. Part III pre-
sents the arguments that both proper statutory construction of
U.S. copyright law and the legislative history of the termination
right, which is closely related to the work made for hire provision,
support the contention that the statute should be read to impose
the bright-line rule. Part IV concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the pow-
er "[t]o promote the Progress of. . . useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings."" Under this constitutional authority, Congress
enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "1976 Act"), a compre-
hensive statutory scheme providing federal copyright protection
to authors for their copyrightable works. Prior to the passage of
the 1976 Act, the last major U.S. copyright legislation was passed
in 1909 (the "1909 Act"). By the time the 1976 Act was passed,
the need for a revision of the nation's copyright laws was long
overdue. In describing the need for a revision of the copyright law
back in 1961, then-Register of Copyrights Abraham L. Kamin-
stein described the 1909 Act as "uncertain, inconsistent, or inade-
quate in its application to present-day conditions.""
The 1976 Act, while described within the bill as a "general re-
vision" of copyright law, in fact completely replaced the nation's
previous copyright laws with an entirely new copyright para-
digm. While current copyright practitioners might scoff at the
proposition,20 one of the primary purposes of passing the 1976 Act
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
17. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Copyright Act of
1976.
1s. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW ix-x (Comm. Print
1961) [hereinafter REGISTER'S REPORT 1961].
19. See Copyright Act of 1976 (amending title 17 of the U.S. Code "in its entirety").
20. See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860 & n.32 (1987) (describing the 1976 Act as "complicated" and
"unclear," and citing, as an example, the "reams" of material written on just the federal
preemption provision of the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)).
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was to clarify U.S. copyright law.21 Prior to the passage of the
1976 Act, the United States had a dual system of copyright pro-
tections: unpublished works were protected by state common law,
while published works were protected by federal law.22 In eradi-
cating this "anachronistic, uncertain, impractical, and highly
complicated dual system" of protections and creating one federal
system, Congress sought to "improve the operation of the copy-
right law and . .. carry[] out the basic constitutional aims of uni-
formity and the promotion of writing and scholarship."23 As the
Supreme Court interpreted this history, Congress's "paramount
goal" in seeking to clarify copyright law was to "enhanc[e] pre-
dictability and certainty of copyright ownership."24
Under the 1976 Act, copyright vests initially in the author of a
work" at the moment of the work's creation.26 The 1976 Act does
not define the term "author," but, according to the Supreme
Court, the author is usually the person who "actually creates the
work."27 The work made for hire provision, however, serves as the
exception to this general rule; if a work is a work made for hire,
"the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author."2 8
There are two different ways that a work can be considered a
work made for hire: If it is either (1) "prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment,"2 9 or (2) a specially
commissioned work, so long as the work fits into one of nine
enumerated categories and "the parties expressly agree in a writ-
ten instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered
a work made for hire."30 If the work is a work made for hire, the
commissioner is the author of the work, and copyright ownership




24. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 129).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (definition of "created"); 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) (2006).
27. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737.
28. § 201(b).
29. § 101 (definition of "work made for hire"). Subsection (1) of the "work made for
hire" definition is not discussed further in this comment.
30. Id.
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vests in the commissioner." Otherwise, the creator is the author,
and the commissioner and the author are free to contract for
transfer of copyright ownership to the commissioner,32 subject to
the author's future termination rights."
Subsection (2) of § 101 ("Subsection (2)") lists three separate
requirements for a work made for hire. First, the work must be
"specially ordered or commissioned."" Second, the work must fit
within one of a list of nine enumerated types of works." Finally,
the parties must "expressly agree in a written instrument signed
by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire."" The requirement of an express, written agreement, while
seemingly clear, does not expressly indicate whether the written
agreement needs to be executed by the parties before the work is
created, and disagreement has arisen between the circuit courts
concerning this requirement." Some courts have held that execu-
tion of the written agreement must occur prior to the creation of
the work," while at least one other has held that the agreement
may be executed after the work is created, but only if the written
agreement reflects some pre-creation agreement that the work be
considered a work made for hire.39
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHEN MUST THE WRITING BE EXECUTED?
In recent years, the courts of appeals have split on whether the
express written agreement required under Subsection (2) must be
executed prior to the creation of the putative work made for hire.
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that express written
agreements must be executed by both parties prior to creation of
31. See § 201(b).
32. See § 201(d).
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(c) (2006).
34. § 101 (definition of "work made for hire").
35. Id. ("[F]or use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as
an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas.").
36. Id.
37. Compare Gladwell Gov't Servs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Marin, 265 F. App'x 624, 626 (9th
Cir. 2008) (unpublished op.) (writing must precede creation of work), and Schiller &
Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1992) (same), with Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 559 (2d Cir. 1995) (writing may postdate creation if
"memorializing" earlier explicit or implicit agreement).
38. E.g., Gladwell Gov't Servs., Inc., 265 F. App'x at 626; Schiller, 969 F.2d at 413.
39. Dumas, 53 F.3d at 559.
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the work in order to satisfy Subsection (2)'s writing requirement,4 0
while the Second Circuit has held that the required writing may
be executed post-creation, as long as there was some pre-creation
agreement that the work would be considered a work made for
hire." This part reviews the primary decisions on each side of the
split.
A. The Written Agreement Must Precede Creation of the Work
1. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp.
In Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., the Seventh Cir-
cuit had to determine, among other things, who owned the copy-
rights in eighteen photographs that appeared in both Schiller &
Schmidt's ("Schiller") and Nordisco's mail-order catalogues.42
Schiller brought suit against Nordisco for copyright infringement
for using the eighteen photographs in its catalogue after they had
first appeared in Schiller's catalogue.43 The photographs were
taken by an independent contractor hired by Schiller and at
Schiller's direction.4 4 Schiller had to prove that it owned copy-
rights in the eighteen photographs in order to have standing to
bring suit for infringement." One of the arguments Schiller ad-
vanced in claiming it owned the copyrights was that the photo-
graphs were works made for hire under Subsection (2).46 Accord-
ing to the court, there was no question that the works were
specially commissioned by Schiller and fit within one of the nine
enumerated categories of works." The determinative factor on
this issue, therefore, was whether there was a writing sufficient
to satisfy Subsection (2)'s requirements." A writing existed,
signed by the independent contractor (but not by Schiller), that
"agree[d] that [Schiller] has owned the copyright [in the photos],"
but the writing was executed by the independent contractor well
after the photographs were taken and the mail-order catalogues
40. See Gladwell Gov't Servs., Inc., 265 F. App'x at 626; Schiller, 969 F.2d at 413.
41. Dumas, 53 F.3d at 559.
42. Schiller, 969 F.2d at 412.
43. Id. at 411-12.
44. Id. at 411.
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were created.49 After analyzing the statutory language of Subsec-
tion (2), the court held that the writing "came too late," and that
the work therefore did not qualify as a work made for hire.o
In coming to its decision, the court noted that the writing re-
quirement of Subsection (2) did not serve "merely [as] a statute of
frauds, although that is the purpose emphasized by the cases.""
Citing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative histo-
ry of the work made for hire doctrine, the court held the writing
requirement "has a second purpose-to make the ownership of
property rights in intellectual property clear and definite, so that
such property will be readily marketable."52 Accordingly, the court
held that "[t]he writing must precede the creation of the [work] in
order to . .. identify[ the (noncreator) owner unequivocally."" Be-
cause the writing was not executed until after the photographs
were taken, the work could not be considered a work made for
hire despite the writing's attempt to retroactively declare the
photos as such.54
2. Gladwell Government Services, Inc. v. County of Marin
In Gladwell Government Services, Inc. v. County of Marin, the
Ninth Circuit had to determine whether Diane Gladwell's declar-
atory action claiming copyright ownership in works she created
was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss filed by Marin Coun-
ty claiming that a work made for hire agreement gave the county
ownership (and authorship) in Gladwell's works." Gladwell
claimed some of her works had been created prior to her signing
any agreement with Marin County." The parties agreed that
49. Id. (first and third alterations in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
50. Id. at 412-13. While it may be argued that the language used in the alleged work
made for hire agreement might not have been sufficient to create such an arrangement
even if it had been signed prior to creation of the photographs, the court ruled explicitly on
the issue of the timing of the agreement. Id.
51. Id. at 412 (citing Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1989);
Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d
323, 328 n.8 (5th Cir. 1987)).
52. Id. (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750 (1989)).
53. Id. at 413.
54. See id. at 412-13.
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Subsection (2) was the governing provision on the matter and
that the work was both specially ordered or commissioned and
that the work was a compilation and therefore one of the nine
categories of works listed in Subsection (2)." Accordingly, the de-
terminative issue was whether the work made for hire agreement
could retroactively make those previously created materials
works made for hire."
In finding that Gladwell's claim was sufficient to defeat a mo-
tion to dismiss, the court held "[t]he plain language of [Subsection
(2)] indicates that a work-for-hire agreement cannot apply to
works that are already in existence. Works 'specially ordered or
commissioned' can only be made after the execution of an express
agreement between the parties."" The court cited both Schiller
and Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas for this proposition, de-
spite the fact that Dumas held that post-creation writings can ef-
fectively memorialize pre-creation non-written work made for
hire agreements." Nevertheless, the court quoted the Schiller
court, stating "'[t]he writing must precede the creation of the
property' to qualify as a work-for-hire agreement.""1 Despite the
ambiguity, it appears that the Ninth Circuit, on balance, supports
the view that the bright-line construction of Subsection (2) is the
correct one.
B. The Writing May Memorialize a Pre-Creation Oral Agreement:
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, the Second Circuit had
to determine whether each of a series of approximately 285 pieces
of artwork, painted by an independent contractor for publication
in Playboy magazine, should be considered works made for hire. 2
57. See Appellees' Brief at 11-12, Gladwell, 265 F. App'x 624 (No. 05-17327), 2006 WL
2427076; see also Appellants' Reply Brief at 12-15, Gladwell, 265 F. App'x 624 (No. 05-
17327), 2006 WL 3032621 (arguing a work-for-hire agreement must precede creation of
copyright-protected works like factual compilations).
58. See Gladwell, 265 F. App'x at 625-26.
59. Id. at 626 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 558-59 (2d Cir.
1995); Schiller, 969 F.2d at 412-13).
60. Id.; Dumas, 53 F.3d at 559.
61. Gladwell, 265 F. App'x at 625-26 (quoting Schiller, 969 F.2d at 413).
62. See Dumas, 53 F.3d at 551-52. Although a number of these paintings were created
prior to January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act, this comment focuses only on
those works created after the effective date of the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
2012] 1183
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Playboy paid the independent contractor by check individually for
each work after he delivered the work to Playboy." There was no
underlying written agreement that the independent contractor
would provide artwork to Playboy; instead, each check contained
a legend agreement, the purpose of which was to create a written
agreement indicating the paintings were created on a work made
for hire basis.64 The court had to determine whether these post-
creation writings were sufficient to satisfy Subsection (2)'s writ-
ten agreement requirement." The court declined to follow the
Seventh Circuit's lead in Schiller, holding instead that "the writ-
ing requirement of [Subsection (2)] can be met by a writing exe-
cuted after the work is created, if the writing confirms a prior
agreement, either explicit or implicit, made before the creation of
the work.""
In declining to follow the Seventh Circuit, the court noted with
approval much of the Schiller court's reasoning." The court
agreed that one of the purposes of Subsection (2)'s writing re-
quirement was "to make the ownership of intellectual property
63. Dumas, 53 F.3d at 552.
64. See id. Between 1974 and July 1979, the checks contained the following legend:
"Any alteration of this legend agreement voids this check. By endorsement of this check,
payee acknowledges payment in full for the assignment to Playboy Enterprises, Inc. of all
right, title, and interest in and to the following items: [a description of a painting fol-
lowed]." Id. (alteration in original). Between September 1979 and March 1981, a different
legend appeared:
Any alteration of this legend agreement voids this check. BY ENDORSE-
MENT, PAYEE: acknowledges payment in full for services rendered on a
work-made-for-hire basis in connection with the Work named on the face of
this check, and confirms ownership by Playboy Enterprises, Inc. of all right,
title and interest (except physical possession), including all rights of copy-
right, in and to the Work.
Id. Finally, between March 1981 and May 1984, the following legend appeared:
Any alteration of this legend agreement voids this check. IT CONTAINS THE
ENTIRE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PARTIES AND MAY NOT BE
CHANGED EXCEPT BY A WRITING SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES. BY
ENDORSEMENT, PAYEE: acknowledges payment in full for the services
rendered on a work-made-for-hire basis in connection with the Work named
on the face of the this check and confirms ownership by Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. of all right, title, and interest (except physical possession), including all
right of copyright, in and to the Work.
Id.
65. Id. at 558. The court also had to determine whether the specific language in each
of the legend agreements was sufficient to create a work made for hire agreement but first
addressed the issue of timing. Id.
66. See id. at 559.
67. See id. at 558-59.
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rights clear and definite."" The court also agreed that this "'pre-
dictability' would be thwarted if a hiring party and an independ-
ent contractor could enter into a work-for-hire agreement years
after a work was created."69 It was here, however, the court de-
parted with the Seventh Circuit. Holding that the parties must
agree that the work will be a work made for hire prior to creation,
it expressed concern that a bright-line rule requiring the writing
to be executed prior to creation might itself create uncertainty.o
To mitigate this uncertainty, the court held that a post-creation
writing memorializing a pre-creation agreement would be suffi-
cient to satisfy Subsection (2)'s writing requirement.n
III. COURTS SHOULD REQUIRE PRE- CREATION EXECUTION OF THE
WRITTEN AGREEMENT
A. Surrounding Statutory Scheme Requires Pre-Creation
Execution of the Written Agreement
1. Authorship Is Defined at the Moment a Work Is Created
Subsection (2) is clear that, in the context of independent con-
tractors, the parties must "expressly agree in a written instru-
ment signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire,"" but Subsection (2) does not expressly indicate
when that writing must be executed. Application of two common
canons of statutory interpretation, however, resolves the appar-
ent ambiguity created by this omission in favor of a bright-line
rule that the written agreement must be executed prior to the
work's creation in order for the work to be considered a work
made for hire. The first of these canons is that "[i]n ascertaining
the plain meaning of [a] statute, the court must look to the par-
ticular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and
design of the statute as a whole."" The second canon is that "indi-
68. Id. at 559.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
5.03[B] [2] [b] (1994)).
71. Id.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (definition of "work made for hire").
73. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (citing Bethesda Hosp.
Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 403-05 (1988); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentive, 477
U.S. 207, 220-21 (1986)).
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vidual sections of a single statute should be construed together."
Review of Subsection (2) in the context of the entire 1976 Act,
therefore, is critical to its proper interpretation.
Several statutory provisions of the 1976 Act are relevant to this
analysis. First, under the 1976 Act, copyright protection exists in
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression."7 The 1976 Act further defines that a work is "fixed"
when it is "embodi[ed] in a copy . .. sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than transitory duration."7 To be
''original" a work must be independently created (as opposed to
copied) and possess "at least some minimal degree of creativity."
The threshold for "creativity" is "extremely low[,] even a slight
amount will suffice."78 The 1976 Act also defines when a work is
"created": "A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy . . . for the
first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the
portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes
the work as of that time."7  Finally, although undefined in the
statute, the Supreme Court has noted that "[a]s a general rule,
the author is the party who actually creates the work."o
Under the 1976 Act, then, once a work is "created," it receives
copyright protection."' Because the 1976 Act protects "original
works of authorship," at the moment a work is created, it has a
statutory author in whom copyright protections initially vest.82
Authorship, of course, is a permanent concept; the creator of a
work cannot change once a work receives copyright protection."
Even courts holding that there need not be a pre-creation execu-
tion of Subsection (2)'s required writing agree with this funda-
74. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244 (1972).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
76. § 101 (definition of "fixed").
77. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citing 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 [A], [B] (1990)).
78. Id.
79. § 101 (definition of "created").
80. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
81. See § 101 (definition of "created"); § 102(a).
82. See § 102(a).
83. Cf. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 559 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting
"[wle ... question whether Congress intended that a work could have two separate 'au-
thors'--one during the first phase of its existence, and another after a work-for-hire
agreement were [sic] executed" in determining that parties must agree that a work is to be
considered a work made for hire prior to the work's creation).
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mental concept by requiring that the post-creation writing memo-
rialize some pre-creation agreement that the work is a work made
for hire;84 however, this concept-that authorship of a work can-
not change-is exactly what calls into question holdings allowing
post-creation execution of the required written agreement.
For a work to be considered a work made for hire under Sub-
section (2), three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the work must
be "specially ordered or commissioned," (2) the work must fit into
one of the nine enumerated categories listed in the statute, and
(3) the parties must "expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire." 5 If all of these criteria are not satisfied, the work is not a
work made for hire." The moment the work is created, however,
it is still a fixed work which qualifies for copyright protection,
meaning that authorship is established." This is where argu-
ments for allowing post-creation execution of Subsection (2)'s
written agreement requirement fail; by allowing post-creation ex-
ecutions, even those that memorialize some pre-creation agree-
ment between the parties, courts effectively allow the parties to
change who the author is after authorship has already been stat-
utorily determined through the provision of copyright protection.
"Authorship," however, is not transferable; authorship is deter-
mined at the moment of a work's creation (i.e., the moment at
which copyright protection attaches), and cannot change." Allow-
ing post-creation written agreements to satisfy the Subsection (2)
requirement runs directly contrary to this concept of authorship.
Courts, therefore, should hold that Subsection (2) requires pre-
creation execution of a written work made for hire agreement.
84. See, e.g., Dumas, 53 F.3d at 559.
85. § 101 (definition of "work made for hire").
86. See id.
87. See § 102(a).
88. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006) (allowing transfer of copyright ownership, but not
mentioning the transferability of authorship); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH
CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 68 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter REGISTER'S
REPORT 1965] ("Section 201(b) also provides that ... the employer and employee could
agree to any disposition between them of the exclusive rights under the copyright, but it
would not allow them to change the status of a 'work made for hire' under the statute.").
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2. Comparison with Statutory Provisions for Copyright Transfers
Subsection (2) is not the only provision of the 1976 Act that re-
quires the execution of some form of written instrument. The
1976 Act also requires that simple transfers of copyright owner-
ship be made in writing." A line of cases exists, however, holding
that oral transfers of copyright ownership can be validated ab ini-
tio by a post-transfer writing.90 The differences in the statutory
provisions at issue in the oral transfer line of cases and the Sub-
section (2) cases, however, support a reading of the statute re-
quiring pre-creation execution of the written work made for hire
agreement.
The statutory provision in the oral transfer line of cases, 17
U.S.C. § 204(a), differs substantially from Subsection (2). Specifi-
cally, the types of writing required by the two provisions differ:
Subsection (2) requires "the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire,"" while § 204(a) requires only "an instrument
of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in
writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed."9 2 This
distinction is an important one. By including the language "note
or memorandum of the transfer," Congress explicitly contemplat-
ed that later writings could validate oral assignments of copy-
right ab initio." This "note or memorandum of the transfer" lan-
guage does not appear in Subsection (2).
The Supreme Court has noted that "when the legislature uses
certain language in one part of the statute and different language
in another, the court assumes different meanings were intend-
ed."94 Section 204(a) is a statute of frauds for copyright transfers,
the purpose of which is to protect copyright owners from false
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006).
90. E.g., Arthur Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Drew Homes, Inc., 29 F.3d 1529, 1533 (11th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Great S. Homes, Inc. v. Johnson & Thompson Realtors, 797 F. Supp.
609, 612 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)); see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 5.03[B][2][b] n.127.7
(2011).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (definition of "work made for hire").
92. § 204(a) (emphasis added).
93. See Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
94. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (quoting 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (6th rev. ed. 2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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claims of oral transfers of copyright ownership." If Congress had
intended Subsection (2)'s writing requirement to serve only as a
statute of frauds against false oral claims of work made for hire
agreements and had contemplated that later writings could give
legal effect to earlier oral agreements that a work was to be con-
sidered a work made for hire, it stands to reason that Congress
would have used the same language." Congress, however, chose
not to. Instead, the language of Subsection (2) imposes a more ex-
acting writing requirement than does § 204(a). Construing the
two statutes in the same way would ignore this intentional differ-
ence in wording." Because it is the "note or memorandum of the
transfer" language of § 204(a)" missing from Subsection (2),
which authorizes the use of later writings to memorialize prior
oral agreements, Subsection (2) should not be interpreted to allow
such post-oral-agreement memorializations.
B. Legislative History of the 1976Act's Termination Right
Reflects Congressional Intent to Protect Authors
The legislative history of the 1976 Act provides further support
for a bright-line rule requiring pre-creation execution of Subsec-
tion (2)'s written agreement requirement. While the legislative
history surrounding the development of the definition of "works
made for hire" is silent on the issue of timing, the history of the
closely related termination right sheds some light on the congres-
sional intent behind the work made for hire provision."
The drafters of the 1976 Act did not start with a blank slate
when it came to termination rights, though the right under the
95. See Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982).
96. Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 711 n.9 (quoting 2A SINGER, supra note 94) ("[W]hen the leg-
islature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another,
the court assumes different meanings were intended."); Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Con-
gress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." (alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 427 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
97. Cf. Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 ("We refrain from concluding here that the differing
language in the two subsections has the same meaning in each. We would not presume to
ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.").
98. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006).
99. See REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 88, at 66 ("Whether or not a work is con-
sidered 'made for hire' has a number of important consequences, particularly in relation
to ... the right to terminate transfers under section 203.").
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1909 Act was not exactly a termination right. Unlike the 1976
Act, which provides for a single, unitary term of copyright dura-
tion for works created after its effective date,'00 the 1909 Act pro-
vided that a copyright's duration was twenty-eight years, with
the possibility that the author could renew the copyright for an
additional twenty-eight years.' The right of renewal belonged to
the author of the copyrighted work, not to the party then owning
the copyright. 102 If an author chose to exercise her renewal right,
the second twenty-eight year copyright term would belong to her.
One of the primary purposes in allowing authors to exercise the
renewal right was to protect authors against unremunerative
transfers due to an author's "relatively poor bargaining position"
as compared to that of publishers."'
This renewal right, however, was not as robust as the termina-
tion right in the 1976 Act. Most importantly, there were few re-
strictions on the transferability of the author's renewal rights.
The Supreme Court once noted that "[a]n assignment by an au-
thor of his renewal rights made before the original copyright ex-
pires is valid against the world, if the author is alive at the com-
mencement of the renewal period."'04 The Court slightly whittled
down this assignability by holding that an author could only as-
sign an "expectancy" in the renewal right, meaning that, if the
author passed away prior to the final year of the copyright,'0' the
renewal right would pass to the author's statutory heirs despite
the assignment.'o Despite this gesture, the renewal right under
the 1909 Act served as weak protection for authors.
This was the state of the law when Congress placed the Copy-
right Office in charge of leading negotiations between parties
with varying interests in copyright laws to reach a compromise.'
100. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1978).
102. Id.
103. See REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 18, at 92.
104. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960) (citing
Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 634, 657-58 (1943)).
105. The author could only renew the copyright during the last year of the initial
term's duration. See § 24.
106. Miller Music Corp., 362 U.S. at 377-78.
107. At the outset of the process leading to the passage of the 1976 Act, the Copyright
Office formed an advisory panel made up of leaders from various industries with often op-
posite stakes in the nation's copyright laws. See REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 88,
at xii-xiii. The advisory panel eventually included "more than a hundred persons, repre-
senting almost everyone who had any real interest in the subject." Litman, supra note 20,
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When the Register of Copyrights released his first report recom-
mending changes to the nation's copyright laws, he noted that
"[the renewal right] has largely failed to accomplish the purpose
of protecting authors and their heirs against improvident trans-
fers, and has been the source of much confusion and litigation,"
and recommended that the renewal right be eliminated from the
next copyright statute.o' Still, the Register believed that authors
needed protection, stating "[the Copyright Office] believe[s] that
some other provision should be made to permit [authors] to rene-
gotiate their transfers that do not give them a reasonable share of
the economic returns from their works."09
Throughout the negotiations led by the Copyright Office, the
matter of termination rights was "the most explosive and difficult
issue" encountered."o Publishers and other commissioners vehe-
mently resisted the inclusion of any sort of termination right,
denying the Copyright Office's assertion that authors needed pro-
tection due to any poor bargaining position and arguing that
commissioners and creators should be free to enter contracts as
they wished."' Despite this pushback, however, the Copyright Of-
fice held fast to the belief that the existence of termination rights
was "one of the most important elements of the copyright law re-
vision program.""2 In the end, the Register recommended termi-
nation provisions that were very similar to those finally enacted
by Congress in the 1976 Act.113
Congress, by enacting the Register's recommend transfer pro-
visions, sided with the Register on the matter of the need for pro-
tection of authors. In its report on the 1976 Act, the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary noted that a termination provision "[was]
needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, re-
at 827 & n.90 (citation omitted). The Copyright Office created an initial set of recommen-
dations for consideration by the advisory panel and then, with input from the advisory
panel, created a series of revised drafts, until all parties involved agreed to accept the lan-
guage. Cf. REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 88, at xiii ("We have decided not to burden
this supplement by attempting to trace in detail how the language and content of the
[1965 draft] bill evolved through the intermediate stages of the preliminary draft of 1963
and the bill of 1964.").
108. See REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 18, at 92.
109. Id.
110. REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 88, at 71.
111. Id. at 72.
112. Id.
113. Compare id. at 71-76 (describing the Registers recommended termination provi-
sions), with 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
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sulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's
value until it has been exploited."" Congress, it appears, trusted
the Register's judgment that authors needed protection in the
form of an inalienable right to terminate their copyright trans-
fers.
How does the fact that Congress sought to protect authors in
the form of inalienable termination rights support the proposition
that courts should read Subsection (2)'s writing requirement as a
bright-line rule? In many ways the declaration of a work as one
made for hire is similar to a transfer of the author's termination
right. Because the work is a work made for hire, the creator has
no termination right, and the commissioner/author has the right
to own the copyright for the duration of its existence."' While
Congress created a path for this result by enacting Subsection (2),
it seems a reasonable proposition that any ambiguities in that
path should be resolved by courts in favor of the congressional in-
tent to protect the interest of authors.
A bright-line rule best suits this purpose because it ensures
that the creator recognizes the gravity of the agreement she is en-
tering. Allowing post-creation memorializations of pre-creation
agreements, on the other hand, adds an air of uncertainty to the
calculus. The most obvious of these uncertainties will be the
question of whether the commissioner truly conveyed that the
work was to be a work made for hire or merely that the creator
would be transferring her rights in the work to the commissioner.
The requirement of a pre-creation writing ensures that, should a
dispute later arise between the parties, a court will easily be able
to review the language used by the parties in order to make a de-
termination on the issue. Given the two options presented by the
courts to date, it is clear that a bright-line rule requiring pre-
creation execution of work made for hire agreements protects au-
thors more than allowing post-creation execution of some oral
agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The concept of authorship is an important one in copyright law;
the Constitution gives Congress the authority to protect the
114. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740.
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (2006).
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works of "Authors" through the limited grant of a monopoly on
their works through copyright law."5 In most cases, the answer to
the question, "Who's the author?" is so obvious that no statutory
definition is necessary. In the context of commissioned works,
however, the question becomes more complicated: Should the
commissioner or the creator be considered the author? In passing
the 1976 Act, Congress chose to answer this question through the
works made for hire doctrine. If a work is a work made for hire,
the commissioning party is the author and copyright ownership
initially vests in that commissioning party; otherwise, the person
who actually created the work is treated as the legal author. 1 7
Unless the creator is an employee of the commissioner, Subsec-
tion (2) governs the determination of whether a work is one made
for hire. Subsection (2) requires, among other things, that the
commissioner and the creator agree in a written, signed agree-
ment that the work will be considered a work made for hire, but
Subsection (2) does not explicitly indicate when that agreement
must be executed. A circuit split has arisen between a bright-line
rule requiring pre-creation execution of the written agreement,
and allowing for post-creation execution of some unwritten pre-
creation agreement. While there are compelling reasons for allow-
ing post-creation memorialization of pre-creation agreements, 18
the statutory language of the 1976 Act generally, and subsection
(2) specifically, supports the conclusion that Congress intended a
bright-line rule. In addition to being a proper construction of the
statute, this conclusion best gives effect to the congressional de-
sire to protect authors from unremunerative transfers by allow-
ing them to terminate those transfers.
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